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SEC V. DOROZHKO’S AFFIRMATIVE
MISREPRESENTATION THEORY OF
INSIDER TRADING: AN IMPROPER
MEANS TO A PROPER END
Historically, prosecution under Section 10(b) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 has been limited to cases of nondisclosure fraud
involving breach of a fiduciary duty to the corporation, its shareholders,
or the source of the material nonpublic information. Some legal scholars
criticize the limited scope of this law, arguing that it creates a loophole
through which persons may trade on stolen material nonpublic
information without fear of prosecution.
Bringing this issue to the forefront was a 2009 case, SEC v.
Dorozhko, involving a Ukrainian citizen who hacked into a company’s
secure computer network where he accessed corporate financials prior to
their release. In its opinion, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals greatly
extended the reach of the SEC’s policing power by adopting a new theory
of insider, which eliminates the fiduciary duty requirement in cases
involving an affirmative misrepresentation rather than a nondisclosure.
In light of the court’s unprecedented holding, this note examines the
second circuit’s approach, arguing that the Circuit impermissibly
combined two distinct theories of securities fraud. Notwithstanding the
second circuit’s flawed approach, this note goes on to argue that computer
hacking carried out in connection with securities trades should be
condemned by the securities laws under the fraud on the investor theory
of insider trading as a matter of public policy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Trading on material nonpublic information continues to be a hotbutton issue on Wall Street as investors are continually searching for
1
and trading on informational advantages. With corporate America
1. Susan Pulliam et al., U.S. in Vast Insider Trading Probe, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 2010, at
A1.
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becoming increasingly digitalized, outsiders are finding new ways to
obtain an informational advantage, such as hacking into secured
2
computer networks housing confidential corporate information. To
adapt to these new technological developments and to root out
fraudulent schemes carried out using the internet, the Securities &
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) established the Office of Internet
3
Enforcement (“OIE”) in 1998. Since that time, the SEC has identified
and prosecuted numerous hackers for engaging in fraudulent schemes in
4
connection with securities transactions.
Congress has never defined insider trading, leaving it to the courts to
determine the extent of the prohibition. Guided by only the 1934
Securities and Exchange Act’s vague prohibition against purchasing or
5
selling securities using deceptive devices, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the deception element of insider trading to require a breach
of a fiduciary duty owed by the trader to either the company, its
6
shareholders, or the source of the material nonpublic information. If a
trader owes such a duty, he or she must “disclose or abstain” from
7
trading on the nonpublic information. As such, historically the SEC
8
9
10
found only company insiders, temporary insiders, misappropriators,
2. See, e.g., Devlin Barrett et al., Nasdaq Confirm Breach in Network, WALL ST. J., Feb.
7, 2011, at C1.
3. Press Release, SEC, SEC Creates Office of Internet Enforcement to Battle Online
Securities Fraud (July 28, 1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/digest/1998/dig072898.
pdf. The SEC restructured the Division of Enforcement in early 2010. As a result, the Office
of Internet Enforcement was dissolved. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Names New
Specialized Unit Chiefs and Head of New Office of Market Intelligence (Jan. 13, 2010),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-5.htm.
4. Troy A. Paredes, Commissioner, SEC, Remarks Before the CyberSecurities Fraud
Forum (Sept. 23, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch092308tar.htm.
See, e.g., Blue Bottle Ltd., Litig. Release No. 20018, 90 SEC Docket 268 (Feb. 26, 2007);
Lohmus Haavel & Viisemann, Litig. Release No. 19450, 86 SEC Docket 1591 (Nov. 1, 2005).
In both cases, the court granted the SEC its requested relief but declined to issue a written
opinion. Id.; see also SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 50–51 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding that a
computer hacker could be liable under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 should the lower court
find that computer hacking is deceptive under the statute).
5. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78j(a)–(b), 78i(a), 78(k) (2006).
6. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 660 (1997) (holding that the defendant
had committed fraud through nondisclosure because the defendant had a duty to disclose to
the source of the information (his firm) that he would trade on); Chiarella v. United States,
445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980) (holding that “a duty to disclose under section 10(b) does not arise
from the mere possession of nonpublic market information”).
7. The disclose or abstain rule requires investors who wish to trade on the basis of
nonpublic information to either disclose such information or abstain from trading altogether.
8. Corporate insiders include corporate directors, officers, employees, and other
permanent insiders. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
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11

and tippees liable for insider trading under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b12
5. Outsiders with no fiduciary duty have avoided liability.
On numerous occasions, the Supreme Court has rejected the parity
of information approach to insider trading that would prohibit all trades
made on nonpublic information irrespective of how the information was
13
obtained.
Of course, the SEC has found that such a limitation
frustrates its ability to regulate the securities market. To avoid this
frustration, the SEC has continually sought to expand its regulatory
14
power to reach all trades made on informational advantages. Despite
repeated rejections, the SEC has continued to strive for something close
to parity by chipping away at the Court’s initially narrow interpretation
of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5—their latest victory being the Second
15
Circuit’s unprecedented decision in SEC v. Dorozhko.
In Dorozhko the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that
computer hacking may be deemed a “deceptive device” under Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, despite the absence of a
16
fiduciary duty.
Criticisms of the decision surfaced immediately,
especially from legal scholars who interpreted prior Supreme Court
precedent to foreclose insider trading liability under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 where an outsider owes no fiduciary duty to the company, its

9. Temporary insiders include attorneys, accountants, consultants, and others who
become temporary fiduciaries of a corporation. Id. (citing Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655
n.14 (1983)).
10. Misappropriators include corporate outsiders who owe a fiduciary duty to the source
of material nonpublic information, usually a corporate insider. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652–53.
11. A tippee is a person who “assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a
corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has
breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing information to the tippee, and
the tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach.” Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660. A
tippee may also be liable where he receives information from misappropriators or other
tippees who breach a fiduciary duty of which the tippee is aware or should be aware. Robert
A. Prentice, The Internet and Its Challenges for the Future of Insider Trading Regulation, 12
HARV. J. L. & TECH. 263, 296 (1999).
12. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 665–67.
13. Id. at 656–59; see also Chiarella v. United States, 455 U.S. 222, 232 (1980).
14. See Illegal Insider Trading: How Widespread is the Problem and is There Adequate
Criminal Enforcement?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 138–139
(2006) (statement of Linda C. Thomsen, Director, Division of Enforcement, SEC).
15. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653 (1997) (extending 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 to misappropriators who breach a fiduciary duty to the source of nonpublic
information); SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 50 (2d Cir. 2009) (eliminating the fiduciary duty
requirement in cases involving affirmative misrepresentations rather than nondisclosures).
16. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 51.
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17

shareholders, or the source.
Because computer hackers owe no
fiduciary duty, their conduct, while punishable under wire fraud and
18
19
computer fraud statutes, would not constitute insider trading.
Focusing on Dorozhko and computer hacking in general, this Note
will discuss the development and future of insider trading laws as they
apply to outsiders owing no fiduciary duty. To that end, Part II will
provide a historical background of insider trading law from its common
law origins to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Section 10(b) and
20
Rule 10b-5 in the seminal opinions in Chiarella v. United States, Dirks
21
22
v. SEC, and United States v. O’Hagan. Part III will then discuss the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ recent decision in SEC v. Dorozhko,
which greatly extended the reach of the SEC’s policing power by
eliminating the fiduciary duty requirement if the case involves an
affirmative misrepresentation rather than a nondisclosure. Part IV will
briefly address the lingering question of whether computer hacking is
deceptive in the first place. Part V will then argue that the Second
Circuit impermissibly combined two distinct theories of securities fraud:
nondisclosure fraud or “insider trading,” and affirmative
misrepresentations or “fraud in connection with” a securities
transaction. To illustrate the point, this section will begin with a
discussion of the two theories, followed by an analysis of why computer
hacking does not fall into the broader category not addressed by the
SEC or the Second Circuit, focusing on both elements of the action—
fraud and “in connection with” a securities transaction. Part VI will

17. See, e.g., ProfessorBainbridge.com, The Second Circuit’s Egregious Decision in SEC
v. Dorozhko, (July 29, 2009) http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/
2009/07/the-second-circuits-recent-decision-in-sec-v-dorozhko-available-here-dealt-with-oneof-the-questions-left-open-by-the.html; SEC v. Dorozhko: Second Circuit Dispenses With
Fiduciary Duty Requirement in Hacker Insider Trading Case, SECURITIES DOCKET, July 23,
2009, http://www.securitiesdocket.com/2009/07/23/sec-v-dorozhko-second-circuit-dispenseswith-fiduciary-duty-requirement-in-hacker-insider-trading-case/ (citing online discussion with
Peter Henning); Posting of Joel M. Cohen to The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate
Governance and Financial Regulation, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/07/29/
erosion-of-the-fiduciary-duty-requirement-in-insider-trading-actions/ (July 29, 2009, 9:22
CST).
18. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006). For a list of state computer fraud and
unauthorized access laws visit NCSL.org, Computer Hacking and Unauthorized Access Laws,
http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/TelecommunicationsInformationTechnology/Computer
HackingandUnauthorizedAccessLaws/tabid/13494/Default.aspx (last visited May 18, 2011).
19. Robert Steinbuch, Mere Thieves, 67 MD. L. REV. 570, 589 (2008).
20. 455 U.S. 222 (1980).
21. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
22. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
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argue that, notwithstanding the Second Circuit’s flawed approach,
computer hacking carried out in connection with securities trades should
be condemned by Rule 10b-5 as a matter of public policy. Finally, Part
VII will discuss alternative theories of insider trading that would
proscribe trades made on nonpublic information obtained through
computer hacking, arguing fidelity to Chief Justice Burger’s fraud on the
investor theory.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF INSIDER TRADING LAW
A. Early Insider Trading Law
At the turn of the twentieth century, state law governed securities
23
transactions. Many states permitted insiders to trade on the basis of
24
material, nonpublic information. By many, it was considered a perk for
25
While insiders could not affirmatively
corporate investors.
misrepresent their company’s position, insiders owed no duty to disclose
material information prior to trading on that information through the
26
stock exchange.
An insider had only a duty to disclose material
27
information prior to face-to-face transactions between buyer and seller.
It was not until the 1929 Wall Street stock crash and subsequent
28
depression that Congress passed the first federal securities laws
29
through the Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934
(“Securities Act”). Congress intended for the Securities Act to reassure
and protect investors while also reestablishing the integrity of the stock
30
markets. The 1934 Securities Act addressed insider trading in two
31
32
sections, Section 16 and Section 10(b), the latter being more relevant
23. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES LAW: INSIDER TRADING 3 (1999).
24. Id. at 1–3.
25. ELIZABETH SZOCKYJ, THE LAW AND INSIDER TRADING: IN SEARCH OF A LEVEL
PLAYING FIELD 5 (1993).
26. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (Mass. 1933) (noting that “mere silence does
not usually amount to a breach of duty” particularly in cases where trades occur over the
stock exchange rather than face-to-face).
27. See id.
28. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 23.
29. Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78lll (2006)).
30. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 23.
31. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 16, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 78p (2006)). Section 16 proscribes the use of nonpublic material information by
corporate insiders for purposes of securities trading. Id.
32. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)). The full text reads:
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to this Note.
Section 10(b) of the Securities Act prohibits the use or employment
of any “manipulative” or “deceptive device” in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security that contravenes SEC rules and
33
regulations. The SEC intended Section 10(b) to act as a “catch-all”
34
clause to prevent fraudulent practices within the securities markets.
On its face, Section 10(b) does not mention insider trading nor does it
35
make any conduct unlawful. Rather, it grants the SEC authority to
pass rules forbidding the use of “manipulative” or “deceptive devices”
36
in connection with securities transactions. Pursuant to this rulemaking
37
authority, the SEC later promulgated Rule 10b-5 in 1948. Rule 10b-5
prohibits the use of “any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud” and
“any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
38
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.” In effect, the laws
forbid “(1) using any deceptive device (2) in connection with the
39
purchase or sale of securities, in contravention of [Rule 10b-5].”
For nearly twenty years, the SEC only used Rule 10b-5 to prosecute
insiders who fraudulently misrepresented their company’s position for

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange . . . [t]o use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or any
securities-based swap agreement (as defined in section 206B of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act [15 U.S.C.S. § 78c note]), any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
33. Id. Insider trading is but one form of deception covered under the statute. There is
also a private cause of action for simple fraud where an insider makes an affirmative
misrepresentation affecting the market price of the company’s securities. See, e.g.,
Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 841 F.2d 502, 504, 506, 508 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that a
corporate manager who makes affirmative misrepresentations that, in effect, artificially
support the market price of the company’s stock, may be liable under Section 10(b));
Liebhard v. Square D Co., 811 F. Supp. 354, 354–56 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Margolis v. Caterpillar,
Inc., 815 F. Supp. 1150, 1155 (C.D. Ill. 1991).
34. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202–04, 206 (1976).
35. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 16, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended
at § 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)).
36. See id.
37. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006).
38. Id.
39. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997).
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personal gain. The SEC first applied the rule to an outsider trading on
41
inside information in the case In re Cady, Roberts & Co. In that case,
Robert Gintel, a selling broker, purchased thousands of shares of
42
Shortly thereafter, Curtiss-Wright decided to
Curtiss-Wright stock.
43
reduce its quarterly dividends. Gintel’s partner, J. Cheever Cowdin,
who was also a member of Curtiss-Wright’s board of directors, informed
44
Gintel of the company’s decision. Based on that information, Gintel
sold several thousand shares of the company’s stock prior to Curtiss45
Wright’s public announcement, avoiding major losses for his clients.
The SEC found that Gintel violated Rule 10b-5 by trading on
nonpublic, material information, holding that “insiders must disclose
material facts which are known to them by virtue of their position but
which are not known to persons with whom they deal and which, if
46
known, would affect their investment judgment.” If full disclosure
would be “improper or unrealistic under the circumstances,” the party
47
must abstain from trading. Thus, the “disclose or abstain” rule was
born, requiring that insiders either disclose material information prior to
trading in company stock or abstain from trading altogether. The SEC
48
then outlined two principles supporting a disclosure requirement.
First, the SEC reasoned that a relationship that affords one with direct
or indirect access to material information intended only for corporate
49
persons should not be used for personal gain.
Second, the SEC
reasoned that disclosure should be necessary where it would be
inherently unfair for one with access to material information to take
advantage of that information, to the detriment of those without such
50
51
knowledge. How the party obtained the information was irrelevant.
Because In re Cady, Roberts & Co was an administrative decision, it
did not hold much weight. However, the Second Circuit Court of

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 28.
See generally In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
Id. at 908.
Id. at 909.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 911.
Id.
Id. at 912.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 910–911.
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Appeals later adopted the rule in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. In
Texas Gulf Sulphur, corporate officers were charged under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 after trading in company securities prior to the
53
public announcement of a large mineral strike. The court held that any
person who traded on inside information would be liable under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, whether he accessed that information directly or
indirectly, so long as he knew that the information was not available to
54
those with whom he traded. The court then provided four elements a
party must prove to establish liability under the statute: (i) a fraud or
omission (ii) of material fact (iii) made in connection with the purchase
55
or sale of securities (iv) with scienter or intent to deceive by way of
56
omission. Today, these four elements are still required; however, later
Supreme Court decisions would greatly narrow the scope of the Texas
57
Gulf Sulpher holding.
B. Classical Theory: Limiting Insider Trading
Liability to Corporate Insiders
In 1979, the Supreme Court greatly narrowed the reach of Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by limiting the “disclose or abstain” rule to
situations where the buyer and seller had a relationship of trust and
58
confidence. This is known as the “traditional” or “classical” theory of
59
In situations where an insider wishes to trade on
insider trading.
information known to him solely by virtue of his position within the
corporation, he must either publicly disclose the material information on
which he wishes to trade or abstain from trading on that information
60
altogether. Such insider trading is considered a “deceptive device”
61
because corporate insiders owe a fiduciary duty to their shareholders.

52. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
53. Id. at 847–50.
54. Id. at 852.
55. Scienter is defined as the “mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud.” Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193–94 n.12 (1976).
56. See generally Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833.
57. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 455 U.S. 222, 229–30 (1980). See generally
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
58. Chiarella, 455 U.S. at 228.
59. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
60. See generally In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). Corporate insiders
include corporate officers, directors, controlling stockholders, company employees, attorneys,
accountants, and any other consultants who become temporary fiduciaries of the corporation.
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652 (citing Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983)).
61. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
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When the insider trades on nonpublic information, he breaches this duty
and deceives shareholders by taking unfair advantage of his inside
62
knowledge—knowledge unavailable to the shareholder.
In effect,
under the classical theory, a fiduciary duty to the company’s
63
shareholders is a required element of “deceptive device.”
The Supreme Court first narrowed the scope of Texas Gulf Sulpher
in its Chiarella v. United States opinion. Chiarella, an employee of
Pandick Press, a financial printing company, was charged under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for trading on inside information regarding five
64
impending corporate takeovers. He discovered this information by
deciphering certain information contained in documents he handled
65
while in the employment of Pandick Press. The lower court ruled that
all those who possess inside information must disclose or abstain from
trading on such information; the Supreme Court, however, rejected this
theory upon review for failure to meet the “deceptive device”
66
requirement. Because in cases of nondisclosure there “can be no fraud
[i.e., deception] absent a duty to speak,” the Court held that Chiarella
did not violate Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 because he owed no duty to
67
disclose.
The Court explained that mere possession of material
nonpublic information does not create a duty to disclose under Section
68
10(b). A fiduciary duty between the parties is required. This fiduciary
“duty ar[ises] from (i) the existence of a relationship affording access to
inside information intended to be available only for a corporate
purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take
69
advantage of that information by trading without disclosure.” The
Supreme Court reiterated this point four years later in its decision in
Dirks v. SEC, stating that:
We were explicit in Chiarella in saying that there can be
no duty to disclose where the person who has traded on
inside information “was not [the corporation’s] agent, . . .
was not a fiduciary, [or] was not a person in whom the

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
(1980).
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Chiarella, 455 U.S. at 228.
Id. at 224–25.
Id. at 224.
United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1364 (2d Cir. 1978), rev’d, 445 U.S. 222, 237
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235.
Id.
Id. at 227 (citing Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961)).
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sellers [of the securities] had placed their trust and
confidence.” Not to require such a fiduciary relationship,
we recognized, would “[depart] radically from the
established doctrine that duty arises from a specific
relationship between two parties” and would amount to
“recognizing a general duty between all participants in
market transactions to forgo actions based on material,
70
nonpublic information.”
In Dirks, the Court extended insider trading liability to tippers and
tippees. Dirks, an officer at a New York broker-dealer firm, received
notice from a former officer at Equity Funding of America that the
company grossly overstated its assets by engaging in fraudulent
71
practices. Dirks then confirmed these allegations through a personal
72
investigation.
Neither Dirks nor his firm owned or traded in the
insurance company’s securities, but Dirks did disclose this information
to a number of clients and investors who did in fact own Equity Funding
73
securities.
Upon receiving this information, many of these
shareholders elected to sell their share of the company, avoiding huge
losses incurred by uninformed shareholders as news of the fraud became
74
public. Soon after, the SEC investigated Dirks’ role in uncovering the
fraud and subsequently charged Dirks for insider trading in violation of
75
Section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. Adhering to its decision in Chiarella, the
Court held that one’s duty to disclose material nonpublic information
prior to trading arises not from possessing the information, but rather
76
from the relationship between the parties. Therefore, despite aiding
and abetting investors by tipping them of the fraud allegations, Dirks
was not liable under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because, as a broker,
77
he owed no duty to Equity Funding or its shareholders. The import of
this decision is that a tippee owes a fiduciary duty to company
shareholders only when the insider shares nonpublic material
information in breach of his fiduciary duty to company shareholders,
78
and both the tipper and tippee are aware that such duty was breached.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 (1983) (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232–33).
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 648–49.
Id. at 649.
Id.
Id. at 649–50.
Id.
Id. at 657–658.
Id. at 665.
Id. at 660.
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Here, Dirks, a stranger to Equity Funding, owed no such duty.

C. Misappropriation Theory: Extending Insider Trading Liability to
Outsiders Owing a Fiduciary Duty to Their Source
Because the classical theory reached only persons who owed a
fiduciary duty to company shareholders, the minority in Chiarella
endorsed a more encompassing theory of liability, known as the
80
misappropriation theory.
The misappropriation theory of insider
trading makes it illegal to trade securities based on misappropriated,
81
nonpublic information. Two versions of the theory exist—the “fraud
82
on the investor” theory and the “fraud on the source” theory.
1. Fraud on the Investor Theory
In his dissenting opinion in Chiarella, Chief Justice Burger proposed
a broad reading of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, which would extend
liability to any person who misappropriated nonpublic information
83
using any deceptive device.
Recognizing that silence is generally
permitted during business transactions unless the parties have a
84
fiduciary relationship, Chief Justice Burger argued that liability should
attach when a person obtains an informational advantage “not by
superior experience, foresight, or industry, but by some unlawful
85
means.” Building on this principle, he advocated holding all persons to
the same standard as insiders, requiring any person who
misappropriated material nonpublic information to disclose or abstain
86
from trading on it altogether.

79. Id. at 667.
80. See Chiarella v. United States, 455 U.S. 222, 237–52 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring;
Burger, C.J., dissenting; Blackmun, J., dissenting).
81. Barbara Bader Aldave, Misappropriation: A General Theory of Liability for Trading
on Nonpublic Information, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101, 114 (1984).
82. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 237–252.
83. Id. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
84. This general rule “permits a businessman to capitalize on his experience and skill in
securing and evaluating relevant information [providing] incentive for hard work, careful
analysis, and astute forecasting.” Id. at 239.
85. Id. at 239–240.
86. Id. at 240.
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2. Fraud on the Source Theory
“Fraud on the source” liability was a narrower version of the
misappropriation theory espoused by Justice Stevens in his concurring
87
opinion. He posited that when Chiarella bought securities in the open
market, he violated a duty of silence owed to his employers and its
88
The
customers, the source of material nonpublic information.
89
Supreme Court later adopted this theory in O’Hagan.
90
O’Hagan was partner at Dorsey & Whitney law firm. Grand Met
engaged Dorsey & Whitney as local counsel to manage a potential
91
tender offer for the Pillsbury Company’s common stock. O’Hagan
himself was not involved in the tender offer; however, with knowledge
of the offer, O’Hagan purchased approximately 2500 call options for
92
Pillsbury stock and another 5000 shares of common stock.
When
Grand Met announced the tender offer, the share value increased
significantly. O’Hagan exercised his call options and sold his common
93
stock realizing a profit of more than $4.3 million.
The Court found O’Hagan liable under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b5, holding that “a person who trades in securities for personal profit,
using confidential information misappropriated in breach of a fiduciary
duty to the source of the information, may be held liable for violating
94
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”
O’Hagan’s failure to disclose his
actions to Grand Met and Dorsey & Whitney was deceptive because he
87. Id. at 237 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens suggested that Chiarella violated
Section 10(b) under a narrow version of the misappropriation theory, but concurred in the
result because Chiarella’s counsel did not make that argument at trial. Id. at 238.
88. Id. at 237.
89. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655 (1997). According to the
misappropriation theory, a person violates Rule 10b-5 when he: “(1) misappropriates
material[,] nonpublic information, (2) by breaching a duty arising out of a relationship of trust
and confidence[,] and (3) uses that information in a securities transaction, (4) regardless of
whether he owed any duty to the shareholders of the traded stock.” SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d
439, 443 (9th Cir. 1990). The SEC has successfully argued the misappropriation theory to
impose liability on (1) traditional company insiders, including officers, directors, and senior
management, O’Connor & Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179, 1185,
1187–88 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), (2) rank-and-file employees who breached a fiduciary duty to their
employers, SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 410–12 (7th Cir. 1991), and (3) temporary insiders,
SEC v. Tome, 638 F. Supp. 596, 620–22 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), and (4) possibly family members,
United States v. Willis, 778 F. Supp. 205, 208–09 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). But c.f. United States v.
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568–71 (2d Cir. 1991).
90. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 647–48.
93. Id. at 648.
94. Id. at 646.
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95

had a duty to of nondisclosure to his employer. Essentially, the breach
96
of duty to the source constitutes the requisite deception. Had O’Hagan
disclosed to his employer his intent to trade, his duty would have been
satisfied, and he would not have been subject to Rule 10(b)5.
Moreover, the Court determined that the misappropriation theory
satisfied the “in connection with” element of a Rule 10b-5 action. The
Court reasoned that his conduct was “in connection with the purchase
or sale of a security” because O’Hagan completed the fraud when,
without disclosure to his law firm, he used the information to purchase
and then sell Pillsbury stock, not when he received the confidential
97
information.
Had O’Hagan used the nonpublic information for
purposes unrelated to a securities transaction, he would not be subject
to Rule 10b-5 because the rule does not capture all forms of fraud
involving nonpublic information, but only those used to capitalize on
98
such information.
III. SEC V. DOROZHKO: ELIMINATING THE
FIDUCIARY DUTY REQUIREMENT
The O’Hagan decision was so significant because it expanded
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability to corporate outsiders who owe
no fiduciary duty to the corporation or its shareholders. The Court
elected to base liability, instead, upon the fiduciary duty owed to the
99
source of the material information. However, critics insisted that the
Court adopted an overly restrictive version of misappropriation liability
that frustrates the prosecution of defendants who trade on
100
misappropriated information acquired through other means.
The
Second Circuit attempted to close this gap by holding that the breach of
101
a fiduciary duty is not a required element of “deceptive device.”
95. Id. at 660.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 656.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 660.
100. Donna M. Nagy, Reframing the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading
Liability: A Post-O’Hagan Suggestion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1223, 1225–26 (1998). To illustrate,
because a computer hacker has no connection whatsoever—let alone a fiduciary
relationship—with the source of confidential information, some scholars have concluded that
computer hacking lacks the type of deception essential to the misappropriation theory,
namely “feigned fidelity” to the source. See id. at 1247, 1253, 1254, 1262, 1263. Thus, the
misappropriation theory would not extend to cases where the defendant trades on
information gained illegally through computer hacking.
101. SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 49–50 (2d Cir. 2009).
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A. The Case: Dorozhko Hacks and Trades
In early October 2007, IMS Health, Inc. announced that it would
release its third-quarter financials after the securities markets closed at
102
5:00 p.m. on October 17, 2007. Thomson Financial, Inc., an investor
103
relations and web-hosting firm, managed IMS Health’s release.
On the afternoon of October 17, 2007, Dorozhko hacked into a
secure server at Thomson Financial and downloaded IMS Health’s
104
earnings report.
Shortly before 3:00 p.m., Dorozhko purchased
105
$41,670.90 worth of put options in IMS Health stock. This amounted
to approximately ninety percent of all put options purchased in the
106
As announced, that evening IMS Health
previous six-week period.
released its third-quarter earnings, which were twenty-eight percent
107
lower than Wall Street expectations.
When the market opened the
next morning, the value of IMS Health’s stock declined approximately
108
twenty-eight percent.
The defendant sold his options within six
109
minutes of the opening bell, realizing a profit of $286,456.59 overnight.
The SEC received notice of this irregular trading activity and
successfully sought a temporary restraining order preventing the
110
defendant from accessing the funds in his brokerage account.
The
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York later
denied the SEC’s request for a preliminary injunction for failure to show
likelihood of success on the merits, reasoning that, as a matter of law,
“computer hacking was not ‘deceptive’ within the meaning of Section
111
10(b) as defined by the Supreme Court.”
The court stated that “a
breach of a fiduciary duty of disclosure is a required element of any
112
‘deceptive’ device under section 10(b).” Owing no duty to either IMS
Health shareholders or Thomson Financial, Dorozhko was not liable
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, despite violating a number of state
113
and federal statutes criminalizing computer hacking.
The SEC
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 44.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. This amounted to approximately a 700% return on investment.
Id. at 44–45.
Id. at 45.
Id. (citing SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)).
Id.
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appealed.
B. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Adopts a New
“Affirmative Misrepresentation Theory of Insider Trading,”
Eliminating the Fiduciary Duty Requirement
On appeal, the SEC recognized that the facts did not fit under either
the classical or “fraud on the source” misappropriation theory of insider
114
trading because no fiduciary duty was breached. Rather, it urged the
court to recognize the alleged hacking as an affirmative
misrepresentation, which would not require breach of a fiduciary duty to
115
be fraudulent.
The court accepted the SEC’s argument, overturned
the district court’s decision and remanded the case for further
proceedings to determine whether computer hacking was “deceptive” or
116
mere theft.
In holding that a breach of fiduciary duty was not required for
computer hacking to be “deceptive” under Section 10(b), the court
distinguished fraud by nondisclosure from fraud by affirmative
117
misrepresentation. The court explained that previous Supreme Court
decisions dealt only with cases of mere nondisclosure and that the
common law theory of fraudulent nondisclosure requires breach of a
fiduciary duty while the theory of fraudulent misrepresentation does
118
not.
Neither Chiarella, O’Hagan, or Dirks precluded premising
Section 10(b) liability on common law fraud. Chiarella’s “case
119
concern[ed] the legal effect of [his] silence.” Likewise, O’Hagan’s case
concerned his failure to disclose his intent to trade on material
120
nonpublic information to the source, his employer.
Finally, Dirks’
case concerned his failure to publicly disclose his knowledge of Equity
121
In each
Funding’s fraudulent practices prior to tipping his clients.
case, the question of “deception” related to whether the defendant
breached a fiduciary duty to disclose. In Dorozhko on the other hand,
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 51. The district court denied the SEC’s motion for a preliminary injunction
holding that defendant’s hack and trade did not violate section 10(b) because defendant did
not breach a fiduciary duty in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. The alleged
scheme was not manipulative because it did not control or artificially affect market activity.
Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 329.
117. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 49–50.
118. Id.
119. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980).
120. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647–48 (1997).
121. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 649–50 (1983).
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the question of “deception” related not to a breach of a fiduciary duty,
but to an affirmative misrepresentation, which is deceptive in and of
itself. Therefore, in cases involving misrepresentation, a fiduciary duty
122
is not a required element of “deceptive device.”
Because the court
was aware of no Supreme Court case contravening this holding, it added
that “[a]bsent a controlling precedent that ‘deceptive’ has a more
limited meaning, we see no reason to complicate the enforcement of
123
Section 10(b) by divining new requirements.” Essentially, the Second
Circuit viewed its holding as simply paralleling the contours of common
law fraud.
In addition, the court left open the question of whether computer
hacking is deceptive in the first place.
Despite asserting that
“misrepresenting one’s identity in order to gain access to information
that is otherwise off limits, and then stealing that information is plainly
124
‘deceptive’ within the ordinary meaning of the word,” the court
hesitated to apply this general principle to the set of facts before it.
Instead, it remanded the case to the district court to determine whether
the computer hacking in this particular case involved an affirmative
misrepresentation, deceptive within the ordinary meaning of Section
10(b). Upon remand, the court granted the SEC summary judgment
125
after the motion went unopposed.
IV. COMPUTER HACKING—“DECEPTIVE THEFT” OR “MERE THEFT?”
Because Dorozhko’s case was dismissed upon an unopposed motion
for summary judgment, the question still remains as to whether
126
computer hacking is indeed “deceptive.” Prior to the Second Circuit’s
122. See id. at 649–51. But see Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston
(USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 389 & n.30 (5th Cir. 2007) (interpreting Chiarella and O’Hagan as
“establish[ing] that a device, such as a scheme, is not ‘deceptive’ unless it involves breach of
some duty of candid disclosure.”).
123. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 49.
124. Id. at 51.
125. Dorozhko, Litig. Release No. 21465, 2010 WL 1213430 (Mar. 29, 2010).
126. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 51. Factual findings regarding the nature of Dorozhko’s
hacking were required because the record did not contain such information. First, Dorozhko
elected to invoke his Fifth Amendment right to refrain from testifying. Second, Dorozhko
“concealed his exit from the computer system,” and third, Thomson Financial chose not to
fully explore the details of Dorozhko’s method of hacking so that it could protect certain
trade secrets. Brief of Appellant at 24–25, SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009) (No.
08-0201-CV). Upon remand, the SEC, in its motion for summary judgment, admitted that is
still had not determined how Dorozhko gained access to Thomson’s computers.
Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff at 14, SEC
v. Dorozhko, No. 07-CIV-9606 (NRB) (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Further, beyond quoting the Second
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Dorozhko opinion, legal scholars generally thought that theft of inside
127
information, while punishable under criminal codes, would not give
128
rise to insider trading liability. The reasoning behind this assumption
was that liability based on an affirmative misrepresentation is actionable
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 only if the court finds a false
129
representation, in other words, a “lie.”
So, for example, if a person
forcefully broke into an office and stole material nonpublic information
for the purpose of securities trading, the thief would be subject to
criminal theft or burglary charges but free from insider trading liability
130
because there was no lie. The requisite fraud or deception would be
131
missing.
In its brief submitted to the Court of Appeals, the SEC argued that
hackers gain access to nonpublic information stored on computer in two
132
ways, both of which constitute affirmative misrepresentations.
First,
hackers may falsely identify themselves by masquerading as other
133
authorized users.
Second, a hacker might “exploit a weakness in an
[electronic code] within a program” to grant him access to otherwise
134
In the court’s view, “misrepresenting one’s
unavailable content.
identity in order to gain access to information that is otherwise off
135
limits, and then stealing that information is plainly ‘deceptive.’” For
example, if a computer hacker accesses nonpublic information by using
a password he is not authorized to use, he deceives the computer by
impersonating the rightful user.
This impersonation constitutes
136
deception.
With companies increasingly turning to computers to
perform tasks once completed by human beings, such as granting and
Circuit opinion, the SEC’s brief in support of its summary judgment motion offered little
argument as to why computer hacking should be deemed deceptive. It simply offered that
Dorozhko accessed IMS Health’s earnings “by infiltrating, tricking, and misleading Thomson
Financial’s highly complex and secure computer security systems.” Id. at 12.
127. See sources cited supra note 18.
128. See sources cited supra note 4.
129. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Ruling on Hackers as Inside Traders: Right in Theory,
Wrong on the Law, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Oct. 9, 2009, at 1, available at
http://www.wlf.org/Upload/legalstudies/legalbackgrounder/100909Bainbridge_LB.pdf.
130. See SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
131. Id.
132. SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 50–51 (2d Cir. 2009).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 51.
136. Randall W. Quinn, Comment: The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading in
the Supreme Court: A (Brief) Response to the (Many) Critics of United States v. O’Hagan, 8
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 865, 894–95 (2003).
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denying access to confidential information once stored offline, there
should be no distinction between deceiving a person or a computer.
The Second Circuit struggled with whether accessing unauthorized
information stored on a computer by “exploiting code” was deception or
mere theft. On one hand, this conduct parallels the thief who exploits
the weakness in a building’s security system in order to break in and
137
physically steal information.
This conduct would not be deceptive
138
because the theft was carried out by using force, not deceit. On the
other hand, code exploitation techniques may be characterized as
allowing hackers “to take control of the target program’s execution flow
by tricking it into running a piece of malicious code that has been
139
smuggled into memory.” Computer hackers may trick a computer into
completing actions the hacker wants it to do even when the code, as
140
written, was designed to prevent those actions. Trickery is a form of
deception; so, if this characterization were accepted, code exploitation
141
would also be deceptive under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
V. THE SECOND CIRCUIT EFFECTIVELY COMBINED TWO DISTINCT
THEORIES OF SECURITIES FRAUD INTO ONE
Although computer hacking may be characterized as deceptive or
fraudulent conduct, the link between such fraud and the securities
transaction is misplaced. The Second Circuit’s unprecedented holding—
that a fiduciary duty is not an element of an insider trading case where
an affirmative misrepresentation is involved—effectively combines two
distinct theories of securities fraud by substituting an insider trading
case’s fiduciary duty analysis with a common law affirmative
misrepresentation analysis.
By definition, insider trading cases involve nondisclosure fraud. In a
typical scenario, a corporate insider purchases or sells stock after failing
to disclose his superior knowledge to the public. Liability under Section
10(b) attaches because the insider breached his duty to disclose. This
section will begin by distinguishing the two theories of fraud, then
explain why the case cannot be proved under a traditional affirmative
137. See id. at 895.
138. See id.
139. JON ERICKSON, HACKING: THE ART OF EXPLOITATION 118 (2d ed. 2008)
(emphasis added).
140. Id. at 87.
141. For a summary of various computer hacking techniques and an argument as to why
each is deceptive under 10(b) see Michael D. Wheatley, Apologia for the Second Circuit’s
Opinion in SEC v. Dorozhko, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 25, 47–50 (2010).
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misrepresentation theory.
A. Distinguishing Nondisclosure Fraud from
Affirmative Misrepresentation Fraud
To establish a case under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, there must
be (1) a deceptive device (i.e., fraud) (2) in connection with the
142
purchase or sale of securities, in contravention of Rule 10b-5.
Plaintiffs may bring claims under this general prohibition by arguing two
theories of fraud: nondisclosure or affirmative misrepresentation.
Nondisclosure cases are those cases traditionally referred to as “insider
trading,” while affirmative misrepresentation cases fall into a more
general category of securities fraud which prohibits all fraud in
connection with securities trades.
Insider trading involves the nondisclosure of material nonpublic
information, gained not by skill or effort, but rather through the
investor’s relationship to the issuing company, its shareholders, or the
143
source of his nonpublic information.
The “deceptive device” is the
144
The fiduciary duty
trader’s breach of that fiduciary relationship.
requirement reflects the principles that mere possession of nonpublic
145
information does not trigger a duty of disclosure and that the federal
securities laws target “the inappropriate and deceptive use of special
146
Where an investor receives nonpublic information
relationships.”
through permissible channels and without an obligation to keep the
information confidential or where the investor discloses the information
to his fiduciary prior to trading, Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not
147
forbid trades based on such information. Again, computer hackers do
not fit under this category of cases because the hacker owes no fiduciary
duty.
Affirmative misrepresentation cases, on the other hand, generally
involve a material misrepresentation made to the investing public for
148
the purpose of inducing the sale or purchase of stock.
The
142. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997).
143. Id. at 658–59.
144. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980).
145. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 651–54 (1983) (discussing Chiarella v. United States,
455 U.S. 222 (1980)).
146. Cohen, supra note 17.
147. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662–63.
148. See, e.g., Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 841 F.2d 502, 506 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding
that where a defendant’s 10b-5 action is based on an affirmative misrepresentation which
distorts the value of stock, the defendant need not have owe a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff to
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misrepresentation involved is made by the defendant to induce someone
else to enter into a securities transaction, not to inform his own
securities transaction. These cases do not fall under the title of “insider
trading,” but rather under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5’s general
prohibition against fraud in connection with securities transactions. The
“deceptive device” here is the material misrepresentation of fact.
Finding a computer hacker liable under this theory is equally
unprecedented as affirmative misrepresentation cases have never dealt
with false statements made to computers.
B. Why an Affirmative Misrepresentation Made to A Computer is Not
Punishable Under 10(b)’s General Prohibition Against Fraud
Connection with a Securities Transaction
Likely recognizing that computer hacking would not fall under the
general prohibition against fraud in connection with a securities
transaction, the SEC argued for a new theory of insider trading,
accepted by the Second Circuit, that substitutes the longstanding
fiduciary duty requirement with a test for common law fraud. This
section discusses why the SEC did not pursue a traditional affirmative
misrepresentation cause of action. First, the SEC would have faced a
significant hurdle in establishing fraud, namely the elements of
materiality and reliance. Second, certain timing issues related to the
consummation of the fraud arise with regard to the “in connection with”
requirement.
1. Problems with Establishing Fraud
Although computer hacking may be characterized as fraudulent
conduct, the link between such fraud and the securities transaction is
misplaced. Under the common law, liability for mere nondisclosure
149
requires a fiduciary duty to disclose.
This duty to disclose “arises
when one party has information ‘that the other [party] is entitled to
know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and
150
confidence between them.’”
However, liability for fraudulent
151
To establish a prima facie case, the
misrepresentation does not.
plaintiff must show that the defendant (i) made a false representation

be held liable).
149. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(1) (1976).
150. Chiarella v. United States, 455 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a)).
151. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525.
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(ii) concerning a material fact (iii) “for the purpose of inducing [him] to
act or to refrain from action,” (iv) that he actually and justifiably relied
upon the representation and (v) that his injury was caused by such
152
reliance.
A computer hacker thus makes a false representation of
material fact by falsely identifying himself to a computer system as an
authorized user. The computer then relies on this misrepresentation
when it grants access to the hacker. This false identification is made to
induce the computer system into allowing him access he would
otherwise not be granted. Breach of the computer system’s security
measures would result in injury when confidential information is stolen.
Even if computer hacking is deemed fraudulent, the definition of
fraud under securities law does not mirror its definition under the
common law. In fact, the Court has explicitly stated that “Section 10(b)
153
does not incorporate common-law fraud into federal law.” Take for
example the elements of materiality and reliance. Under 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, the fact must be material to the investor. Likewise, the
investor must rely on the misrepresented material fact. It is not
sufficient for there to be any material fact or reliance by anyone
somewhere in the factual situation presented. Consequently, computer
hacking does not fit neatly into a traditional affirmative
misrepresentation case. The following discussion of the materiality and
reliance requirements will further illuminate the point.
A statement is material if it is substantially likely that a reasonable
investor would consider the information relevant to his decision to
purchase or sell securities and if it “alter[s] the ‘total mix’ of information

152. Id.
153. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. 552 U.S. 148, 162 (2008)
(citing SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 820 (2002)); see also Cohen, supra note 17. In his blog
posting, Cohen argues that the Second Circuit’s decision:
[P]ermits the SEC to simply characterize alleged illegal trading as an
“affirmative misrepresentation” whenever it cannot adequately establish
the existence of a fiduciary relationship. Historically, the fiduciaryrelationship element has required the SEC to meet exacting pleading
standards; now, regulators have license to charge many acts of gardenvariety fraud or financial unfairness under the nebulous rubric of
“affirmative misrepresentation.” Conceivably, that could embrace any
fraud involving the purchase or sale of securities, not merely the
prototypical Section 10(b) charge where insiders exploit inside
information for personal advantage as a normal emolument of corporate
office.
Id. (citation omitted).
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154

made available.”
While a false statement to a computer may be
deemed material in that the user would be denied access if they used
their true identity, it does not meet the 10b-5 standard because the false
statement does not affect investor decision making. The fact that the
information Dorozhko stole met this definition of material is irrelevant.
To meet the materiality requirement in the computer hacking context,
the Court would need to broaden the definition of materiality to
encompass any material misrepresentation made in connection with a
securities transaction. Currently, the law appears to extend only to
material misrepresentations made to the investing public.
Again, the same issue arises with the element of reliance. Reliance
is a required element of a Section 10(b) action because it establishes the
causal connection between the misrepresentation and the economic
injury; in other words, but for the misrepresentation, the investor would
155
have refrained from entering a securities transaction.
The
misrepresentation need not be the sole cause, but a substantial or
156
significant one. In the securities context, a court determines whether
the investor relied on an affirmative misrepresentation by weighing
several factors:
(1) The sophistication and expertise of the plaintiff in
financial and securities matters; (2) the existence of long
standing business or personal relationships; (3) access to
relevant information; (4) the existence of a fiduciary
relationship; (5) concealment of the fraud; (6) the
opportunity to detect fraud; (7) whether the plaintiff
initiated the stock transaction or sought to expedite the
transaction; and (8) the specificity or generality of the
157
misrepresentations.
Recognizing that direct proof of reliance is oftentimes an irrelevant
158
and unreasonable evidentiary burden, the Court adopted the fraud on
154. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). In other words, if the nonpublic information would
affect the company’s stock price, the information would be material.
155. Id. at 243. In the section 10(b) context, reliance is coterminous with causation in
fact. Wilson v. Comtech Telecomm. Corp., 648 F.2d 88, 92 & n.7 (2d Cir. 1981).
156. Wilson, 648 F.2d at 92.
157. Kennedy v. Josephthal & Co., 814 F.2d 798, 804 (1st Cir. 1987) (quoting Zobrist v.
Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1516–17 (10th Cir. 1983)).
158. In Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th Cir. 1975), the Ninth Circuit
eliminated the direct reliance requirement. It explained:
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159

the market theory of reliance. This theory assumes that stock prices
are determined by an investor’s evaluation of publicly available material
information; therefore, any material misrepresentation will alter the
stock price, effectively defrauding investors who rely on price as an
160
indication of the stock’s value.
A computer relying on a false
identification does not fall within 10b-5’s understanding of reliance
because the hacker’s misrepresentation is made to a computer, not an
investor. In the securities law context, it is reliance on the part of the
investor that matters. In the computer hacker context, at most, the
investor relies on any distortion in price caused by the hacker’s
subsequent trade. It is a stretch to say that but for the computer hack,
the investor would not have engaged in a securities transaction. The
link between the affirmative misrepresentation and reliance by the
investor is a step removed. For Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to apply
courts would need to fashion a theory of reliance that bridged the gap
between the misrepresentation and investor’s reliance.

A purchaser on the stock exchanges may be either unaware of a specific
false representation, or may not directly rely on it; he may purchase
because of a favorable price trend, price earnings ratio, or some other
factor. Nevertheless, he relies generally on the supposition that the
market price is validly set and that no unsuspected manipulation has
artificially inflated the price, and thus indirectly on the truth of the
representations underlying the stock price—whether he is aware of it or
not, the price he pays reflects material misrepresentations. Requiring
direct proof from each purchaser that he relied on a particular
representation when purchasing would defeat recovery by those whose
reliance was indirect, despite the fact that the causational chain is broken
only if the purchaser would have purchased the stock even had he known
of the misrepresentation.
Id. at 907.
159. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 241–43.
160. Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160–61 (3d Cir. 1986). In Peil, the court stated:
The causal connection between the defendants’ fraud and the plaintiffs’
purchase of stock in such a case is no less significant than in a case of
direct reliance on misrepresentations. In both cases, defendants’
fraudulent statements or omissions cause plaintiffs to purchase stock they
would not have purchased absent defendants’ misstatements and/or
omissions.
Id.
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2. Problems With Timing and the “in Connection With” Requirement
Though easier to overcome, issues of timing arise with regard to the
statute’s second element: the “in connection with” requirement.
Whether computer hacking for purposes of obtaining nonpublic
information is sufficiently “in connection with” the purchase or sale of
securities to fall under Section 10(b) depends largely on how a court
characterizes the fraudulent act. The SEC interprets the phrase broadly,
but not “so broadly as to convert every common law fraud that happens
to involves securities into a violation of 10(b). Section 10(b) requires
“deception ‘in connection with the purchase or sale of any security,’ not
161
deception of an identifiable purchaser or seller.” The general rule is
that the “scheme to defraud and the sale of securities coincide[;]”
162
however its application is far from clear.
In O’Hagan, the court construed the “in connection with”
requirement within the context of its newly adopted misappropriation
theory. Recognizing that nonpublic information is property to which a
company is entitled exclusive use, the Court reasoned that “fraud is
consummated, not when the fiduciary gains the confidential
information, but [rather] when . . . the information [is used] to purchase
163
or sell securities.”
This hurdle is necessary because, in a
misappropriation on the source case, receipt of nonpublic information is
not fraudulent; rather it is the investor’s later breach of his fiduciary
duty to his source. Therefore, “[t]he securities transaction and the
164
breach of duty . . . coincide.” The securities transaction and the breach
of duty would not coincide, however, if the property obtained through
fraudulent means had independent value—that is, the property could be
165
used for any number of transaction unrelated to the securities market.
161. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997).
162. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 822 (2002).
163. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656.
164. Id. at 656.
165. The government conceded that embezzling funds to finance a security trade, while
fraudulent, is not “in connection with” the purchase or sale of securities, because the
misappropriated funds have independent value—that is, the funds could be used for any
number of transactions unrelated to the securities market. Therefore, a subsequent securities
trade would be sufficiently detached from the “in connection with” requirement.
Misappropriation of nonpublic information, on the other hand, derives its value solely from
its utility in securities trading. Id. This discussion appeared as dicta, so it was initially unclear
whether the Court intended to introduce a requirement that the property obtained have no
independent value. However, five years later, the Court in SEC v. Zandford stated that it did
not “read O’Hagan as so limited.” Zandford, 535 U.S. at 824. This reading makes sense
because it is counterintuitive to draw lines based on possible alternative uses of property
when it is clear from the facts that the investor obtained the information with but one
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This distinction is of little concern here because the Court accepted that
misappropriated nonpublic information had no value apart from its
utility in securities trading.
Affirmative misrepresentation cases, however, are different. Here,
the fraudulent act is the misrepresentation itself—no subsequent
166
conduct is necessary to consummate the fraud. On the other hand, in
Dorozhko’s case, the hack and subsequent securities transaction took
place only thirty minutes apart, arguably as part of one single scheme to
167
defraud. If characterized as a single scheme, the fraud would not be
complete until the securities transaction was complete; if Dorozhko
chose not to engage in a securities transaction, his hack would not
trigger Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Borrowing the Court’s language
in O’Hagan, Dorozhko’s “fraud [was] consummated not when [he]
gain[ed] the confidential information, but when . . . he use[d] the
information to purchase [and] sell securities. [Dorozhko’s] securities
transaction and the breach of [the computer’s secure network] thus
168
coincide.”
The intent underlying the Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
prohibition supports the single scheme viewpoint because the ultimate
securities transaction affects the integrity of the market the same way
169
insider trading would.
A single scheme approach is also supported by the Court’s decision
in United States v. Zandford, which couched the “in connection with”
170
requirement in terms of independent events. In Zandford, a securities
broker persuaded a client to grant him a power of attorney allowing him
171
to engage in securities transactions without prior approval. Using this
power, the broker then sold his client’s securities and embezzled the
172
proceeds. The Court deemed this “scheme” deceptive because “each
[sale] was neither authorized by, nor disclosed to, the [client]. . . . Each
time [Zandford] exercised his power of disposition for his own benefit,
173
that conduct, without more, was a fraud.” The Court determined that
Zandford’s fraud and sales were not independent events; rather the

intent—to use that information as a basis for his securities transaction.
166. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656.
167. SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) rev’d, SEC v.
Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42 (2nd Cir. 2009).
168. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656.
169. See id. at 685–869 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
170. See Zandford, 535 U.S. at 820–21.
171. Id. at 815.
172. Id. at 821.
173. Id. at 820–821 (internal citations omitted).
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174

fraud coincided with the sales themselves.
Arguably, Dorozkho’s
fraud coincided with his later purchase and sale of securities because the
hack and subsequent transaction were not independent events. That
Dorozhko’s hack and subsequent trade occurred only thirty minutes
apart indicates that hack was designed to acquire nonpublic information
that would inform his securities transactions.
With two logical and competing arguments construing the “in
connection requirement,” it is hardly clear how the Court would decide
the issue. Although there is a strong argument that Dorozhko’s hack
and trade was one deceptive scheme, it is equally plausible that the
Court would deem the fraud consummated by the misrepresentation
itself.
VI. HISTORY AND GOOD PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTS CONDEMNATION
OF COMPUTER HACKING IN CONNECTION WITH SECURITIES
TRANSACTIONS UNDER SECTION 10(B) AND RULE 10B-5.
Focusing insider trading liability on a fiduciary duty has created a
gap in enforcement that makes trades based on lawfully obtained
nonpublic information illegal and trades based on unlawfully obtained
175
nonpublic information legal. This anomalous result makes little sense.
Therefore, although the Second Circuit’s newly derived theory of insider
176
trading liability does not comport with current securities law, history
and good policy favors a finding that computer hacking is in fact
deceptive under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
Such policy
considerations include (1) the original intent of the securities laws, (2)
economic efficiency, (3) moral considerations of fairness, (4) implied
congressional consent, and most importantly (5) more appropriate
punishment and remedies.
A. Original Intent of the Securities Laws
First, in promulgating Section 10(b) and Rule 10-b5, Congress did
not intend to delineate specific acts or practices that constitute fraud.
Rather, the laws were “designed to encompass the infinite variety of
devices by which undue advantage may be taken of investors and
177
others.”
Thus, “[c]onduct by a defendant that had the principal
purpose and effect of creating a false appearance in deceptive
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 820.
Wheatley, supra note 141, at 51.
See generally Bainbridge, supra note 129, at 1.
In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961).
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transactions as part of a scheme to defraud is conduct that uses or
178
employs a deceptive device within the meaning of Section 10(b).”
Nowhere does Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 premise “deception” on the
179
Furthermore, Section 10(b) was
existence of a fiduciary duty.
180
intended to prohibit invention of any other “cunning devices,”
suggesting that the courts should tailor the laws to capture innovations
not contemplated when the Securities Act was passed. This would
include trading made possible by computer hacking.
Moreover, in 1987, the Senate proposed a bill, the Insider Trading
181
Proscriptions Act (ITP Act) for consideration by Congress. The Act
proposed a statutory definition of insider trading which would have
prohibited:
[T]rading while in possession of material, nonpublic
information . . . if such information has been obtained by,
or its use would constitute, directly or indirectly, (A)
theft, bribery, misrepresentation, espionage (through
electronic or other means) or (B) conversion,
misappropriation, or a breach of any fiduciary duty, any
personal or other relationship of trust and confidence, or
182
any contractual or employment relationship.
Under this language, computer hacking would be illegal insider
trading as theft or espionage through electronic means. Although
Congress ultimately elected not to pass the ITP Act, it was not because
183
the senate objected to the types of conduct included in the definition.
Rather, Congress chose to leave the task of identifying insider trading to
the judiciary, reasoning that “the court-drawn parameters of insider
trading have established clear guidelines for the vast majority of
traditional insider trading cases, and . . . a statutory definition could
potentially be narrowing, and in an unintended manner facilitate
184
schemes to evade the law.” Notwithstanding the abandonment of the
178. Simpson v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1052 (9th Cir. 2006).
179. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
180. Stock Exchange Regulatory Hearing on H.R. 7852 & 8720 Before the H. Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong. 115 (1934) (statement of Thomas Corcoran,
Counsel with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation).
181. Insider Trading Sanctions Act, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677, 11–13 (1988).
182. Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles,
94 IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1368 (2009).
183. Id.
184. Id. (citation omitted).
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ITP Act, it is clear that Congress believes that insider trading law should
reach trades based on nonpublic information acquired through
computer hacking.
B. Economic Efficiency
One goal of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, oft repeated, is the need
to protect the integrity of the securities markets from abuses by those
with access to material nonpublic information that would affect the price
185
of the corporation’s securities upon public disclosure. The “integrity
of the market” rationale for banning insider trading thus relies on the
notion that proper stock valuation can be made only when factors
186
motivating an investor’s trade are available to the public.
If such
factors were unavailable to the outsider, he would theoretically buy or
187
It follows that
sell at the wrong price, resulting in a net loss.
eliminating insider trading would increase investor confidence that they
are not trading at an informational disadvantage. Because the securities
market is the backbone of the American commercial system, integrity of
188
the market is essential; and conduct that threatens market integrity,
such as computer hacking, should therefore violate Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5.
185. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653 (1997) (stating that the purpose of the
Securities Act was “to insure honest securities markets and thereby promote investor
confidence”); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 852 (2d Cir. 1968) (“It was the
intent of Congress that all members of the investing public should be subject to identical
market risks, [which include] the risk that one’s evaluative capacity . . . may exceed another’s
capacity.”).
186. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245, 247 (1988).
187. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 23, at 149–150. Professor Bainbridge argues that this
reasoning is flawed because it assumes that outsiders trade only with insiders making trades
based on nonpublic information. Given the impersonal nature of the securities exchange,
gains will be shared by insiders with knowledge of material nonpublic information and
outsiders with no such knowledge. Id. at 150–51.
188. Illegal Insider Trading: How Widespread Is the Problem and Is There Adequate
Criminal Enforcement?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 1–2
(2006) (statement of Arlen Specter, Senator, State of Pennsylvania). However, some argue
that deregulating insider trading would benefit both society and the firm. See generally
HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966). First, insider
trading would allow for a more efficient market because the market price of a company’s
securities would be set at the level it would receive if the nonpublic information were publicly
available. For example, if a share is selling at $30, but knowledge of material nonpublic
information would cause the price to rise to $40, insider trading would cause the price to
reach $40 earlier—in other words, before the information is made public. Id. at 77–91.
Second, insider trading would serve as an efficient way of compensating and incentivizing
entrepreneurs to innovate. Id. at 131–41. This second argument, however, seems to ignore
the fact that insiders often trade on negative nonpublic information to avoid losses.
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C. Moral Rationale
Allowing theft of nonpublic information committed for the sole
purpose of trading on that information flies in the face of morality.
Justice Blackmun, in his Chiarella minority opinion, noted that the most
“dramatic evidence” of Chiarella’s fraud was the fact that he stole
information for personal benefit knowing that it was wrong and
189
forbidden by his employer. After all, “[t]he more unfair the activity,
190
Securities trading
the more justification there is for regulation.”
191
Thus,
should be free from investors having any undue advantages.
material nonpublic information should not be used for the personal
benefit of anyone because such use would be inherently unfair to
192
outside investors.
This is particularly true when the information is
accessed through unlawful means such as computer fraud. Despite
being a non-fiduciary, arguably, the computer hacker’s conduct is more
reprehensible because the he takes affirmative action to not only use
undue advantage in securities trading, but to also break state and federal
computer fraud laws.
D. Implied Congressional Consent
Congress has opted not to pass legislation limiting the reach of
insider trading laws to transactions made in breach of a fiduciary duty.
While the question of whether a computer hacker, who owes no
fiduciary duty to either the shareholders of a corporation or the source
of confidential information, may be liable for insider trading under Rule
10b-5 was one of first impression for the Second Circuit, it was not the
193
first instance where the SEC prosecuted a computer hacker. In 2005
and 2007, the SEC successfully sought a temporary restraining order to
freeze the defendants’ assets and an order to repatriate funds taken
194
outside of the United States.
Both cases were factually similar to
189. Chiarella v. United States, 455 U.S. 222, 245–46 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
190. Prentice, supra note 11, at 305.
191. Chiarella, 455 U.S. at 241 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 241 (citing In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961)).
193. In Blue Bottle Limited., Litig. Release No. 20018, 90 SEC Docket 268 (Feb. 26,
2007), the defendants were charged with illegally accessing, through a computer system,
information about imminent new releases. Using that information, the defendants traded in
the securities of twelve corporations prior to public dissemination, realizing $2,707,177 in
profits. In Lohmus Haavel & Viisemann, Litig. Release No. 19450, 86 SEC Docket 1591
(Nov. 1, 2005), the defendants were charged “with conducting a fraudulent scheme involving
the electronic theft and trading in advance of more than 360 confidential press releases issued
by more than 200 U.S. public companies,” realizing at least $7.8 million in illegal profits.
194. Blue Bottle Ltd., 90 SEC Docket at 268; Lohmus Haavel & Viisemann, 86 SEC
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195

Dorozhko. Although each judge granted the SEC’s requested relief,
196
neither issued a published opinion. Congress has implied its approval
of such decisions by continuing to take no action in defining insider
trading under federal law.
E. Criminal Computer Fraud Penalties Are Insufficient
Criminal penalties for computer fraud are insufficient where the
misappropriated information is used to trade in securities. First, under
the federal computer fraud statute, a hacker would be subject only to a
197
fine and a term of imprisonment.
Computer fraud statutes do not
provide means for freezing assets or repatriating profits made by foreign
198
defendants. In contrast, under the Securities Act, the SEC is able to
seek injunctive relief to prevent future unlawful trading, asset freezes,
disgorgement of illegally obtained proceeds, and civil penalties of up to
199
three times the illegal profits made or the losses avoided. It may also
seek criminal penalties, including imprisonment, where the selling or
200
buying of securities was willful and fraudulent. As SEC Enforcement
Deputy Director Peter Bresnan points out, “In today’s global economy,
where con artists can misuse computer technology to defraud innocent
U.S. investors from far beyond our borders, freezing the unlawful profits
201
of those behind these intrusion schemes is especially important.”
Second, despite the availability of a private cause of action against
hackers, companies are reluctant to pursue such cases for fear of the
negative publicity that accompanies public disclosure of such security

Docket at 1591.
195. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
196. Id.
197. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)–(c) (2006).
198. See id. § 1030.
199. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(1), 78u-1, 78u-2. Prior to 1984, inside traders were only subject
to disgorgement and possibly criminal sanctions. Civil penalties could not be imposed until
the defendant was convicted criminally. NASSER ARSHADI & THOMAS H. EYSSELL, THE
LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE INSIDER TRADING: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 49 (1993).
This punishment provided little deterrent value. So, in 1984, Congress passed the Insider
Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78), which
increased criminal fines and prison times and allowed the SEC to impose treble damages.
200. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(c), 78u-2. Finally, the SEC is authorized to make “bounty”
payments to any person who provides information leading to civil penalties. The bounty
awarded may be up to 10% of the civil penalty collected. Id. §§ 78u-1.
201. Press Release, SEC, SEC Obtains Order Freezing $3 Million in Proceeds of
Suspected Foreign-Based Account Intrusion Scheme (Mar., 7, 2007) (on file with author),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-33.htm.
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202

breaches. This is particularly true where the security breach does not
203
result in significant financial losses.
Increased penalties serve as a better deterrent and more appropriate
204
punishment.
To illustrate, the SEC oftentimes charges a defendant
with securities fraud under Rule 10b-5 even where it has already
obtained a computer hacking or wire fraud conviction. In SEC v.
Zandford, the defendant was indicted and later convicted of thirteen
205
counts of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. His punishment
consisted of fifty-two months in prison and payment of $10,800 in
206
restitution.
After the indictment, the SEC filed a civil suit alleging
that Zandford also violated Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by engaging in
a scheme to defraud. Zandford was found guilty, and as a result, was
enjoined from engaging in future violations of the securities laws and
207
ordered to disgorge the $343,000 he realized in ill-gotten gains. Had
Section 10(b) been unavailable, Zandford would have retained the fruit
of his crime.
VII. ARGUING FIDELITY TO CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER’S FRAUD ON THE
INVESTOR THEORY OF INSIDER TRADING
Because the newly created affirmative misrepresentation theory
cannot be sustained and computer hacking does not fit within the
contours of classical insider trading or the fraud on the source theory
adopted by the Supreme Court in O’Hagan, the Court or Congress must
adopt a new version of the misappropriation theory or an entirely new
theory of insider trading to capture this type of deceptive theft. Legal
scholars have advocated several approaches including the parity of
information theory, property rights theory, deceptive acquisition theory,
and the fraud on investors theory. This section will discuss each briefly,
and then propose the fraud on investors theory as the superior solution.

202. Wheatley, supra note 141, at 55–56.
203. Id.
204. Admittedly, Congress could achieve the same result by revising the computer fraud
statute to add disgorgement, asset freezes, and injunctive relief as available remedies.
205. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 815–16 (2002).
206. Id. at 816.
207. Id.
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A. Parity of Information Theory
The parity of information theory would prohibit trading on all
nonpublic material regardless of the manner in which the investor
gained access to such information. However, this theory has been
repeatedly rejected by the Supreme Court on the grounds that it would
inhibit legitimate activities conducted by market analysts such as
questioning corporate officers and “ferret[ing] out and analyz[ing]
208
information.”
Such inhibition would negatively affect market
efficiency in stock pricing, to the detriment of all investors. Because this
theory has been foreclosed by the Court, adoption would require
congressional action.
B. Property Rights Theory
The property rights theory finds its basis in In re Cady, Roberts &
Co., which based liability on the misuse of “information intended to be
available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit
209
of anyone.” Recognizing that nonpublic information is “property” to
which companies have exclusive use, a property rights approach would
make illegal trades made by an investor who uses, for his personal
benefit, material nonpublic information intended by the company to be
210
used only for a corporate purpose. By eliminating the fiduciary duty
requirement, this rule would capture illegal conduct such as computer
hacking because the information obtained through hacking would be
used for the hacker’s personal benefit rather than for a corporate
211
purpose.
Moreover, this theory would eliminate a misappropriator’s
ability to escape liability my disclosing his intent to trade on nonpublic
information to his source.
The property rights theory, however, may prove overly broad,
212
resulting in over-enforcement.
For example, depending on the
characterization of “personal benefit” and corporate purpose, a
property rights approach may inhibit the legitimate activities of market
analysts. Moreover, this approach may foreclose trading based on
nonpublic information gained through superior skill or effort.

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658–59 (1983).
In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
Wheatley, supra note 141, at 53–54.
Id.
Wheatley, supra note 141, at 54.
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C. Deceptive Acquisition Theory
The “deceptive acquisition” theory has been proposed as an
alternative to the classical and misappropriation theories on insider
213
trading. This theory would make any person who acquired nonpublic
information through deceptive means liable under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, in the absence of a fiduciary relationship. Donna M. Nagy,
Professor of Law at the Indiana University Maurer School of Law, a
proponent of this theory, points out that despite the Supreme Court’s
focus on a fiduciary relationship, the plain language of the statute
contains no such limitation and instead captures all deceptive devices
used in connection with securities trading. Nagy argues that Stoneridge
Investment Partner, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., supported the
“deceptive acquisition” theory when it recognized conduct itself could
214
be deceptive under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Deceptive devices
are not limited to misstatements or omissions made by those with a duty
215
to disclose. To that end, computer hacking could be considered
deceptive conduct in and of itself, despite the fact that the hacker lacked
216
This theory addresses
a preexisting fiduciary duty to the source.
Justice Blackmun’s chief concern in Chiarella—that the Court failed to
adequately consider the fact that Chiarella accessed nonpublic
information that no honest investor could likewise access by legal
means—because it reaches all scenarios where an investor capitalizes on
217
nonpublic information gained solely through deceptive means.
There are limits to the deceptive acquisition theory. First, it leaves
untouchable those investors who obtain nonpublic information through
218
outright theft, because theft lacks the requisite deception. Second, the
deceptive acquisition theory would not prevent a misappropriator from
escaping liability by disclosing to his source his intent to trade, because
such disclosure eliminates any deception.

213. Nagy, supra note 182, at 1369–70.
214. Id. at 1370 (discussing Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552
U.S. 148, 158 (2008)).
215. Id. at 1369–70.
216. Id. at 1370.
217. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 247 (1980).
218. Nagy, supra note 182, at 1372.
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D. Fraud on the Investors Theory
The fraud on the investors theory was espoused by Chief Justice
Burger in his dissenting opinion in Chiarella. The theory prohibits all
trades based on nonpublic information obtained through illegal means.
Burger recognized that in the absence of a fiduciary duty, neither party
to the business transaction has a duty to disclose information unknown
to the other side. The policy underlying this rule breaks down, however,
where such information was obtained by illegal or deceptive means. In
other words, Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 should extend to any person
who misappropriates material nonpublic information for the purposes of
219
securities trading. A duty to abstain or disclose would thus arise even
when the misappropriator owed no fiduciary duty to shareholders or the
220
source.
The fraud on the investors theory of misappropriation is superior to
the aforementioned theories as well as the fraud on the source theory
currently followed for several reasons. First, by premising liability on
access through unlawful means, the fraud on investors theory captures
all forms of misappropriation, including deceptive theft and mere theft.
Second, the fraud on investors theory eliminates timing issues involving
221
the “in connection with” requirement.
By eliminating the breach of
fiduciary duty requirement, the illegal conduct need not coincide with
222
the securities transaction. Instead, the deceptive device occurs when
the defendant fails to disclose the nonpublic information on which he
223
trades to the other parties of a securities transaction. Third, the fraud
on the investors theory better addresses the policies underlying the
Section 10(b) prohibition. The fraud on the investors theory is premised
on the idea that misappropriation, no matter its form, defrauds
224
marketplace traders and serves no useful function other than self225
The best way to guarantee
enrichment at the expense of others.
219. Chiarella, 455 U.S. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Section 10(b)’s broad
language, which reaches any person in any fraudulent scheme, supports this reading by
suggesting that congressional concern was not limited to trading by corporate insiders. Id. at
240–41 (emphasis added).
220. See id.
221. Nagy, supra note 100, at 1300.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Nagy, supra note 182, at 1373 (stating that “it is insider trading’s impact on the
securities market and the confidence of investors that provides the rationale for the Rule 10b5 prohibition”).
225. Chiarella, 455 U.S. at 241 (Burger, C.J. dissenting). Section 10(b)’s legislative
history shows that Congress intended section 10(b) to prohibit “those manipulative and
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integrity of the stock markets is to eliminate all trading based on
misappropriated nonpublic information. Lack of a fiduciary duty does
not change the harm done to market integrity and therefore should not
be a requisite element of an insider trading case. Fourth, the fraud on
the investor theory does not reach legitimate trading activities because
informational advantages obtained through legal channels would not
226
trigger a duty to disclose.
Finally, Supreme Court precedent does not foreclose adoption of the
fraud on the investor theory. In Chiarella, the Court rejected only the
parity of information approach, noting that the government did not
propose the misappropriation theory in its initial appeal. And in Dirks,
the defendant did not misappropriate nonpublic information nor breach
a duty of confidentiality. Finally, in O’Hagan, the Court limited its
analysis to the fraud on the source theory of misappropriation proposed
by the government. The Court did not expressly reject the broader
fraud on the investor theory, leaving open the possibility that it adopt
the theory in the future—much like the Chiarella Court did when it
227
limited its analysis to the narrower theory argued before it.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit’s holding in Dorozkho reached a proper end
through improper means by effectively combining two distinct theories
of Section 10(b) liability into one. It is likely that a case applying the
affirmative misrepresentation theory of insider trading laid out in
Dorozhko will reach the Supreme Court on appeal in the near future.
When such a time comes, the Court should reject this newly created
theory in favor of the fraud on the investors theory originally proposed
by Chief Justice Burger in Chiarella.
One could argue that insider trading liability should not be extended
to computer hackers by the judiciary. However, this ignores the fact
that all insider trading law, including the classical theory and “fraud on
the source” theory, has been judicially created and that “Section 10(b)
228
was designed as a catchall clause to prevent fraudulent practices.”
deceptive practices which have been demonstrated to fulfill no useful function. S. REP. NO.
73-792, at 6 (1934).
226. Nagy, supra note 100, at 1303–1304.
227. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655 n.6 (1997). The Court did not consider
the broader theory proposed by Chief Justice Burger in Chiarella because the government did
not choose to advance such a theory and rather premised its argument on disclosure
obligations to the source of the information. See id. at 652.
228. Chiarella, 455 U.S. at 226.
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Given the courts’ role in defining insider trading, the statute’s plain text,
and the SEC’s policy goals, the Supreme Court should be permitted to
broaden the scope of insider trading liability to capture unlawful
conduct, such as computer hacking, despite lack of a disclosure duty.
“The genius of insider trading law . . . is its flexibility, its ability to
229
accommodate changing business practices, conditions and situations.”
The Court must continue to interpret Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to
meet new challenges in maintaining the integrity of the securities
markets.
The bottom line is that thieves are as culpable as the fiduciary and
should be subject to insider trading laws just the same—to maintain the
integrity of the stock market, eliminate unfairness, and deter future
illegal conduct.
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